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LOCAL HISTORIANS AND STRANGERS WITH BIG
EYES: THE POLITICS OF EWE HISTORY IN GHANA
AND ITS GLOBAL DIASPORA
KATE SKINNER
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM
I
In 2001 I attended a meeting at the London headquarters of the
Movement for a Resurgent Togoland (MORETO). Seven people—
mainly middle-aged and elderly men from the inland Ewe-speaking
areas of Ghana—had gathered together to share their findings about
the modern political history of the area where they were born. They
vocalised their dissatisfaction with the incorporation of this area
within the borders of Ghana at independence in 1957, and they dis-
cussed how this situation came about, and whether it could be recti-
fied.1 In the course of this meeting, I began to realize that contests
over Ewe history had gone global. Controversial issues, which
scholars had previously addressed through detailed diachronic local
studies, were now being played out across a global diaspora, captur-
ing the attention not only of Ewe-speakers originating from a specif-
ic town or district, or having a direct stake in a particular version of
its history, but also of anonymous commentators, scattered thou-
sands of miles across the globe. In this paper, I describe some of my
encounters with Ewe-speaking people who study their recent politi-
cal history, and I analyze some of their writings.2 I suggest that,
History in Africa 37 (2010), 125–158
1Field notes: meeting of the MORETO in Edmonton, London, 27 January 2001.
2I am grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Board for funding my original
doctoral field work, and to the British Academy Small Research Grants Scheme for
funding a more recent trip to Ghana in the summer of 2010.
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despite recent attention to history-writing by Africans during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, further reflection is required on
two key issues: firstly, the circulation of historical knowledge and
forms of historical debate among Africans living in the global dias-
pora; secondly, the implications of this for historians researching the
post-colonial period.
II
Historians of Africa are currently benefiting from studies which
investigate processes of history-writing by African scholars based on
the mainland continent.3 These studies recover Africans’ nineteenth-
and twentieth-century endeavours in reconstructing local, ethnic and
national histories, gathering documentary evidence and oral tradi-
tions, conducting social surveys, and disseminating their findings.
Attention to these distinctive contributions has generated renewed
debate about the unequal relationships between the so-called “profes-
sional” or “university-based” historians, and the “research assis-
tants,” “informants,” and “local” or “amateur” historians with whom
they work and from whom they glean “primary data.”4
Any distinction between “professional” and “amateur” clearly
involves their unequal access to the resources that facilitate research
and its dissemination, but the terms “local historian” and “local his-
tory” are equally problematic. Harneit-Sievers suggests that local
histories “address a range of different small-scale identities [his
emphasis]” and are written as a part of people’s struggle to carve out
for themselves “a place in the world.”5 The Ewe case that I discuss in
this paper, however, resonates with some of the reservations
expressed by Peterson and Macoma.6 The term “local historian” fore-
3Derek Peterson, and Giacomo Macoma (ed.), Recasting the Past: History Writing
and Political Work in Modern Africa (Athens OH, 2009); Axel Harneit-Sievers
(ed.), A Place in the World: New Local Historiographies for Africa and South Asia
(Leiden, 2002).
4For a recovery of the experience, knowledge and insights of an individual formerly
described only as a “research assistant,” see Jean Allman, and T.E. Kyei (ed.), Our
Days Dwindle: Memories of my Childhood Days in Asante (Portsmouth NH, 2001).
5Harneit-Sievers, A Place in the World, 3.
6Derek Peterson, and Giacomo Macoma, “Homespun Historiography and the Acade-
mic Profession,” in: Peterson and Macoma, Recasting the Past, 1-28.
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grounds the bounded nature of an individual’s knowledge and audi-
ence: it implies that this knowledge is restricted to a particular place
or group of people with which the individual is connected and whom
he/she is addressing, and is thus in some sense parochial. This
obscures the “interpretive and representational work” that the indi-
vidual has carried out, because he/she may not be addressing a single
readership that already shares an “identity.” Rather, he/she may be
writing in order “to bring a readership—and a political community—
into being.”7
The Ewe-speaking historians whom I discuss here are anything
but parochial. They might be described as “local historians” in the
sense that they conduct research about the area in which they were
born, and they would like people “back home” to know about their
findings. They do this precisely in order to emphasize one particular
form of political community above other competing forms. But these
researchers do not confine themselves to a “local” audience: they
also address Ghana’s Constitutional Review Commission, the inter-
national community (via the United Nations), and the embassies of
former colonial powers, in order to remind them of previous deci-
sions, outline the consequences for people “back home,” and seek
means of redress.
That history-writing among the Ewe-speakers should be complex
is not very surprising given the frequent changes of political status of
this area during the colonial period. The British extended their con-
trol over the coastal Anlo-Ewe strip between 1850 and 1874, and,
along with the Peki-Ewe area further inland, this became part of the
Gold Coast colony.8 The more mountainous inland area, which is
also home to enclaves of non-Ewe or “minority” peoples, was colo-
nized by the Germans, who worked their way north from the coast
during 1880s to form the colony of Togo.9 The first colonial partition
across the Ewe-speaking area was drawn in 1890, but was revised as
a result of the Allied victory in the First World War. The British and
7Peterson, and Macoma, “Homespun Historiography,” 8.
8D.E.K. Amenumey, “The Extension of British Rule to Anlo (South-East Ghana),
1850-1890,” Journal of African History 9 (1968), 99-117.
9Arthur Knoll, Togo under Imperial Germany, 1884-1914: a Case Study in Colonial
Rule (Stanford CA, 1978).
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French split the former German colony of Togo between them, form-
ing two territories that became subject to international supervision.
Thus the Ewe-speakers who lived in the southern third of the former
German Togo were grouped along with the various southern
“minorities” and several larger northern groups in the League of
Nations mandated territories of British and French Togoland. After
the Second World War, these mandates were referred to as the Unit-
ed Nations (UN) trust territories of British and French Togoland.10
The complexities of the colonial period meant that, as the Ewe-
speakers contemplated decolonization, individuals and organizations
put forward three competing scenarios: (1) that all the Ewe-speaking
peoples should join together to form a single nation-state based on
shared language and culture; (2) that the Ewe-speakers should co-
operate with the other groups within the two trust territories to
achieve a joint Togoland independence (effectively recreating the
national borders of the former German Togo); (3) that the Ewe-
speakers and other peoples of British Togoland should join with
Ghana, leaving French Togoland to negotiate its own independence
from France.11 The present-day border between Ghana and Togo
reflects the implementation of the third of these three solutions.
Scholars from several academic disciplines have been interested in
the recent history of this part of West Africa. Among students of
International Relations, the Ewe case has been examined in a com-
parative context in order to glean insights into the workings and
weaknesses of international supervision.12 Political scientists are also
interested in the Ewe case because it offers them an example against
which to test theory-driven hypotheses about the relative strengths of
10D.E.K. Amenumey, “The pre-1947 Background to the Ewe Unification Question,”
Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana 10 (1960), 65-85.
11D.E.K. Amenumey, The Ewe Unification Movement: a Political History (Accra,
1989).
12The earliest study examining international supervision is James Coleman,
“Togoland,” International Conciliation 509 (1956). For more recent work on inter-
national supervision see Michael Callahan, Mandates and Empire: the League of
Nations and Africa, 1914-1931 (Brighton, 1999). The most important comparative
study is Claude Welch, Dream of Unity: Pan-Africanism and Political Unification in
West Africa (Ithaca NY, 1966).
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ethnicity and nation-state, and to analyze how weak political “cen-
tres” can integrate and retain control over their geographical and cul-
tural “peripheries.”13 The most substantial recent study of the Ghana-
Togo border area, by Paul Nugent, argues that pan-Ewe identity can-
not be assumed, that the borders drawn at independence have proved
surprisingly resilient, and that communities’ political affiliations are
largely determined by highly localized factional disputes and by
local calculations as to what the governing party has to offer.14
Recent examples of history-writing among Ewe-speakers in Ghana
and its global diaspora, however, offer us the opportunity to ask
some very different questions, and to reflect more broadly on
approaches to post-colonial history.
II
I attended the 2001 MORETO meeting in London at the invitation of
the late Dr. Ben Kofi Kodzi. He was born in the early 1930s in
Dodome—an Ewe-speaking town which now lies in Ghana’s Volta
Region, close to the border with Togo, but was previously part of the
UN trust territory of British Togoland.15 Although neither of Kodzi’s
parents had attended school, they both became members of the Ewe
Church and he therefore persuaded them, after a struggle, to support
him through primary school.16 His secondary education was punctu-
ated by a pupil-teacher post, and spells in the Gold Coast capital,
Accra, where he took jobs in a “Syrian” ice cream store, a spare part
store, a brewery, a newspaper and a post office.17 In the early 1960s
13David Brown, “Politics in the Kpandu Area of Ghana, 1925 to 1969: a Study of the
Influence of Central Government and National Politics upon Local Factional Com-
petition,” PhD dissertation, University of Birmingham (1977).
14Paul Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo
Frontier: the Lie of the Borderlands since 1914 (Athens OH, 2002).
15Interview with Kofi Kodzi, Edmonton, London, 19 July 2001.
16The Ewe Church grew from the endeavours of the Pietist Bremen mission society
in the second half of the nineteenth century. It later became known as the Evangeli-
cal Presbyterian Church (and the “Eglise Evangélique” in what is now the Republic
of Togo). See Birgit Meyer, Translating the Devil: Religion and Modernity among
the Ewe in Ghana (Edinburgh, 1999); Hans Debrunner, A Church Between Colonial
Powers: a Study of the Church in Togo (London, 1965).
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he travelled on a UN scholarship to Poland, where he attended uni-
versity.
Kodzi was practising as a medical doctor in Bé (Lomé, Republic
of Togo) when he founded the MORETO in 1984. Soon after, in
1985, he was detained on a trip to Ghana, which was then governed
by the PNDC regime of Jerry Rawlings. After his release he travelled
to the UK, where he wrote and published a vitriolic account of the
abuses inflicted by Rawlings’ regime upon its actual and perceived
opponents, himself included.18 By the time I met Kofi Kodzi at a
West African Studies seminar almost a decade later, he had turned to
Ewe religion, language and history. Aged approximately 70 he was
beginning a PhD thesis on Ewe religion at the University of Birming-
ham.
Initially, I regarded Kofi Kodzi as an “informant” for my own
research, for, as a young man, he had been active in one of the main
political movements that operated along the southern portion of the
Ghana-Togo border during the 1950s. This party, the Togoland Con-
gress, was active among the Ewe-speaking peoples (and indeed the
non-Ewe enclaves) in the southern part of the trust territory of British
Togoland, and it also had a smaller number of supporters in northern
Togoland. The Congress had campaigned—unsuccessfully—for the
reunification of British Togoland with the neighbouring UN trust ter-
ritory of French Togoland and their joint independence as a reunified
Togoland nation-state. Locally, these people were known as “unifica-
tionists” or as Ablode.19 From the interviews that I had conducted
with former Togoland Congress activists during my field work in
Ghana, I knew that some of them were dissatisfied with the UN-
supervised plebiscite that was held in British Togoland in 1956 and
the subsequent incorporation of all of British Togoland (northern and
southern sections) within the borders of Ghana when the latter
17In Ghana, the term “Syrian” is often used to denote all people who came from the
Levant, including those from Lebanon.
18Kofi Kodzi, Worse than South Africa (London, 1991).
19Ablode is an Ewe word meaning “freedom.” “Unificationists” sometimes preferred
to be called “reunificationists” to stress that they were putting back together the
Togo which had been torn asunder during the First World War.
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achieved its independence in 1957 under the government of Kwame
Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party (CPP).
My early hope, therefore, was that Kofi Kodzi would help me in
my own doctoral research by adding to my collection of “insider”
accounts of the ideals, organization and tactics of the “losing side”
during this contested process of decolonization. During our inter-
views, however, I realized that whilst Kodzi was willing to help me,
he also saw me as a potential ally in his objective of re-opening the
border question. He believed that this political project depended
upon historical research on the Ewe-speaking peoples, particularly
those from the inland towns and villages which had belonged to the
former trust territory area. He informed me that our objectives were
complementary and our endeavours could be mutually reinforcing.
As far as Kodzi was concerned, “there is no proper Ewe history,” and
as “the problem with the [inland] Ewes is that we are too timid,” an
outsider might have to start the job.20
Although two historians who were based in North American uni-
versities had recently completed important eco-social and socio-cul-
tural histories of the coastal Anlo-Ewe area, this would have been of
little comfort to Kodzi, who was already concerned that history-writ-
ing in Ghana was dominated by the Anlo.21 He argued that despite
the basic similarity in language between the Anlo and the inland (or
Ewedome) people, and a shared tradition of migration from the east,
the Anlo had never been part of the trust territory and did not share
the historical experiences or political interests of its inhabitants.22
20Interview with Kofi Kodzi, Edmonton, London, 13 December 2000. I smile when I
recall this comment, because no-one who had met Kofi Kodzi would ever describe
him as a timid man!
21Emanuel Akyeampong, Between the Sea and the Lagoon: an Eco-Social History of
the Anlo of South-Eastern Ghana c.1850 to Recent Times (Athens OH, 2001); San-
dra Greene, Gender, Ethnicity, and Social Change on the Upper Slave Coast: a His-
tory of the Anlo-Ewe (Portsmouth NH, 1996); Sandra Greene, Sacred Sites and the
Colonial Encounter: a History of Meaning and Memory in Ghana
(Bloomington/Indianapolis, 2002).
22Geographically, Peki is “inland,” but due to its early colonization by the British, it
did not fall within the trust territory area along with the other “Ewedome” groups.
For an intriguing account of evolution of Ewe migration traditions, and the annual
celebration of the flight of the Ewes from the walled town of Notse, see chapter one
of Greene, Sacred Sites.
132 Kate Skinner
Kodzi was particularly concerned to see even-handed representation
of different Ewe-speaking groups within the Organization for
Research in Eweland, which, at that point, had brought out two vol-
umes of the Handbook of Eweland.23
Kodzi was therefore keen for me to make professional progress,
partly because he was a kind man who wanted me to succeed, and
partly because he wanted to see a scholarly counter-weight to the
University of Ghana’s senior Ewe historians, D.E.K. Amenumey and
Francis Agbodeka. This was a terrifying prospect for a young
researcher, particularly as Kodzi (and indeed other Ewe-speakers)
also liked to remind me of the aphorism Amedzro nku ga me nya
xodome o (usually translated as “a stranger with big eyes can never
see all the corners of the town”).24 This saying suggests that there is
some scepticism on the part of the so-called “local” historians as to
what the so-called “professional” outsiders may have to offer in
terms of knowledge or insight.25 The value of the “stranger with big
eyes” lay elsewhere, and I shall return to this point later on.
The distinction between the coastal Anlo-Ewe and the inland Ewe-
dome may appear to be a rather particularist matter of “identity,” of
importance mainly to those people with a direct stake in the towns in
question, and best approached by historians through detailed
diachronic local studies. From his base in London, however, Kodzi
was pursuing his research agenda through the plethora of voluntary
associations that were flourishing in the late twentieth-century global
Ewe diaspora. The UK branch of the Organization for Research in
Eweland was bringing out its own periodical (Eweland News) to
which Kodzi was a contributor on the history of the Ewe language
23Francis Agbodeka (ed.), A Handbook of Eweland: vol. 1—The Ewes of Southeast-
ern Ghana (Accra, 1997); Francis Agbodeka, and Kodzo Gavua (ed.), A Handbook
of Eweland: vol. 2—The Northern Ewes in Ghana (Accra, 2000). A third volume,
concentrating on the Ewe-speakers in Togo and Bénin, was brought out by Benjamin
Lawrance in 2005. The handbooks did in fact give attention to the different Ewe-
speaking groups.
24Nugent apparently encountered a similar phrase in the Likpe area (see Smugglers,
231). Literally, dome means “between” and xo means “house”—suggesting that a
newcomer cannot see the spaces between the houses where things may be hidden.
25Nugent, Smugglers, 231.
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and its orthography.26 ORE (UK) was planning an “Ewe Language
and Cultural Awareness School” that would teach the mother-tongue
to children of Ewe migrants, and “assimilate the youth into Ewe cul-
ture” in order that they could “communicate with relations when they
visit their respective countries of origin” and “support their ageing
parents in our annual cultural festivals.”27
This emphasis on the umbrella role of ORE (UK) in promoting the
mother-tongue and Ewe culture sat alongside an organizational ten-
dency towards a plethora of smaller associations which mobilized
resources for more specific agendas, some which were associated
with particular towns or districts. These included, among others, an
Anlo Students Union, a Togo Nationals Union, an Atorkor Develop-
ment Foundation, and Noviha (“brotherhood”/“sisterhood”). Kodzi
was anxious to ensure that the Ewedome groups should be well-rep-
resented within the London diaspora, and he wanted a public affir-
mation of academic interest in the Ewedome. He was delighted to
welcome the anthropologist Lynne Brydon to an Easter festival held
in London for migrants from the inland Ewe area.28 But I suspect that
my own reticence disappointed him.
Since Kofi Kodzi’s death in 2008 I have often felt guilty I was not
able to live up to his expectations. I appreciated his letters, the copies
of his drafts on Ewe language and religion, and his visit to me after
the birth of my first child. He taught me many things that I would not
otherwise have known about Togoland and Ewe history, and in this
respect he helped me a great deal. I certainly took Kofi Kodzi seri-
ously as a former political activist and thus as a repository of knowl-
edge and experience regarding Ewedome politics and the border
question in the 1950s. And, given that I am now writing about his
opinions, it is only fair to add that I sympathized with some of his
26Kofi Kodzi, “Orthography of the Ewe Language,” Eweland News 12 (2002), 3.
27B.B.K. Ayivor, “What is ORE (UK) About?” Eweland News 12 (2002), 1.
28Lynne Brydon has worked for over thirty years in Avatime, where the people
speak Siyase, a “Togo remnant” language (see below, footnote 30). The great major-
ity of Avatime people, however, also speak Ewe fluently, partly as a result of mis-
sionary use of standardized Ewe in churches and schools.
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grievances about the ways in which the British, the UN and the CPP
had settled the future of British Togoland in 1956-1957, and about
the treatment of former unificationists during the independence era.
The problem was that I also hesitated over the viability and the wis-
dom of mobilizing these historical grievances behind a twenty-first
century political objective.
In the aftermath of the December 2000 elections, which saw the
departure of Jerry Rawlings (in power since 1981) and the victory of
John Agyekum Kufuor, Kofi Kodzi nursed the hope that the New
Patriotic Party (NPP) government would reopen the Togoland ques-
tion and give renewed attention to the people of the former trust terri-
tory area. It was difficult for me to see why the NPP leadership
should buck the strong continental trend towards maintaining the
borders as they lay at independence.29 Even if the NPP had agreed to
re-open the Togoland question and amend the border, I was not per-
suaded that this would be in the best interests of the people who were
citizens of Ghana, because Ghana’s economy was in better shape
than that of Togo in the year 2001, and Ghanaians enjoyed a much
wider range of civil liberties than their Togolese neighbours living
under the late Gnassingbé Eyadéma.
Were the middle-aged and elderly MORETO members in London
accurately reflecting the views of the majority of voters residing in
the former trust territory area? Or was Kofi Kodzi a lone warrior,
pursuing an issue that was no longer relevant to people who had been
brought up as Ghanaian citizens? Enquiring about the scope for re-
opening the border question during my field work the previous year,
I was struck by the response of one retired educationist, E.K. Datsa,
in the village of Amedzofe-Avatime: “It is now just an old man’s
issue. […] People wouldn’t concern themselves with that kind of lost
29The Volta Region of Ghana (which includes the areas formerly belonging to the
trust territory of British Togoland, along with the Peki and Anlo areas) had voted
heavily in favour of Rawlings and the NDC in 1992, 1996 and 2000. See Paul
Nugent, “Winners, Losers and Also Rans: Money, Moral Authority and Voting Pat-
terns in the Ghana 2000 Election,” African Affairs 100 (2001), 405-28; Paul Nugent,
“The Things that Money can Buy: Chieftaincy, the Media and the 1996 Elections in
Hohoe-North Constituency,” Ghana Studies 4 (2001), 85-106.
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cause. People got on with the opportunities that were open to
them.”30
In his 2002 Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens, Paul
Nugent reviewed a very substantial body of documentary evidence,
which, along with his interviews and observations in the border area,
led him to much the same conclusion as E.K. Datsa. Nugent empha-
sized both the economic advantages that the border presented to the
people living alongside it (smuggling), and the importance of highly
localized, factional struggles (as opposed to any pan-Ewe ethnic sen-
timent) in determining the political affiliations of rural communities.
By the end of the 1950s, Ablode activists had already recognized that
the penalties attached to continued agitation would be severe for
individuals—including long spells in preventive detention or politi-
cally-motivated exclusion from chiefly office by the CPP govern-
ment. Moreover, communities’ access to the developmental
resources of the state depended upon acceptance of (or at least, an
end to vocal/visible opposition to) the status quo. Pointing to the fail-
ure of the 1970s group, TOLIMO, to garner significant support for
the secession of the former British Togoland from Ghana, and the
winding up of its operations in 1977, Nugent concluded: “As far as
the politics of unificationism is concerned, therefore, this really is the
end of the story.”31
III
Then, in 2007, a former Member of Parliament for the Hohoe South
constituency published a book entitled How Britain Subverted and
Betrayed British Togoland. This book was surprising for three rea-
sons. Firstly, its author, Kosi Kedem, belonged to a different genera-
tion to that of Kodzi and the other former Togoland Congress
activists. He was also a graduate of the University of Ghana, and
held a higher degree. Explaining the reduced salience of the border
30Interview with E.K. Datsa, Amedzofe-Avatime, 3 June 1999. Mr. Datsa later
described his own role in the Togoland unification question in his memoir, Doing
My Duty: Memoirs of a Ghanaian Educationist (Accra, 2006), 109-24.
31Nugent, Smugglers, 230.
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issue in the 1960s, Nugent pointed to the rise of a new generation of
local leaders and parliamentarians who had benefitted from the con-
siderable expansion of educational opportunities during the Nkrumah
era. These individuals were heavily invested in social, professional
and developmental networks based in Ghana, and thus, according to
Nugent, “For the generation that increasingly wielded power at the
local level, the Ablode past was as much a foreign country as Togo
itself was.”32 Kedem’s writings, on the other hand, suggested that the
Togoland question was not only an “old man’s issue,” but had now
been taken up by a vocal former parliamentarian from the Ewedome
area.
Secondly, Kedem lists actions taken over a period of several years
by a group of activists and sympathizers. These included attempts to
raise the Togoland question at Ghana’s National Reconciliation
Commission (which was organized in the aftermath of the 2000 elec-
tions and the departure of Jerry Rawlings), and a series of letters sent
to the British High Commissioner in Accra in 2005-2006.33 Thirdly,
Kedem’s book outlines some of the very same issues that my own
elderly interviewees had identified in their explanations of how the
current border settlement had been reached during the 1950s. Indeed,
in his 2005 book, British Togoland: an orphan or the death of a
nation? Kedem even deploys strikingly similar metaphors to those
used in 1950s vernacular and English-language propaganda.34
It would appear then, that since the publication of Nugent’s book,
the Ghana-Togo border question has enjoyed a resurgence of interest,
and that this interest is manifested not only among Ewe-speakers in
32Nugent, Smugglers, 218.
33Kosi Kedem, How Britain Subverted and Betrayed British Togoland (Accra,
2007), 47-66. Although Ghana had held multi-party elections in 1992 and 1996,
these had resulted in victory for Jerry Rawlings and his party. 2000 was considered
to be a litmus test because Rawlings had now served the two presidential terms per-
mitted under the 1992 constitution. Commentators were anxious to find out whether
he would indeed hand over power to Kufuor and the NPP, thus “consolidating”
Ghana’s transition to a multi-party democracy. See Nugent, “Winners.”
34Kosi Kedem, British Togoland: an Orphan or the Death of a Nation (Accra,
2005). For more on unificationist propaganda in the 1950s, see Kate Skinner, “Read-
ing, Writing and Rallies: the Politics of ‘Freedom’ in Southern British Togoland
1953-1956,” Journal of African History 48 (2007), 123-47.
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Ghana, but also in the global diaspora. Evidence of renewed activism
does not necessarily invalidate Nugent’s broader conclusions about
the resilience of the border: after all, an issue that exercises a particu-
lar pressure group may not be a priority for the majority. It is also
important to clarify that Kedem was not leading a secessionist move-
ment along the lines of the TOLIMO in the 1970s: his focus was on
the nature of the union between Ghana and the former British
Togoland, and, more specifically, on the British and CPP interpreta-
tion of the 1956 plebiscite as a mandate for unconditional integration
rather than as a basis for a round-table conference on the terms of a
Ghana-Togoland union.
Kedem considered that “complete separation and full unfettered
sovereignty” for the former British Togoland was, in principle, legiti-
mate, given the achievement of such sovereignty by other former UN
trust territories. However,
The fact is that Ghana and Togoland have been together for over ninety
years and reality on the ground indicates that this [i.e. a separate
Togoland nation-state] may not be too popular an option unless it is
forced on the people by extreme provocation where dialogue and diplo-
macy are completely ruled out or if the hawks and the extremists in the
Togoland Nationalist front are compelled by unavoidable circumstances
to resort to extreme alternatives [his emphasis].35
Kedem’s preferred option, therefore, was “a thorough review, regu-
larization and rectification” of the “political relationship” between
Ghana and the former trust territory of British Togoland, and “a
properly written union agreement [his emphasis].”36 The absence of
such an agreement was a key element in the proposals that he sent to
the Constitutional Review Commission in 2010.37 Kofi Kodzi also
told me that he had written to the UN on several occasions, asking
them to forward him a copy of the Ghana-British Togoland union
agreement. He argued that the failure of the UN to produce such a
35Kedem, How Britain, 20-21.
36Kedem, How Britain, 21.
37I am grateful to Kosi Kedem for providing me with a copy of his published pro-
posals, 2010 Constitutional Review Commission and the Rectification of the Ghana-
British Togoland Union (Accra, 2010).
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document for public scrutiny was evidence that the status quo was de
facto rather than de jure, and did not therefore constitute an
immutable legal union.
In comparison with the factors that David Brown identifies in his
studies of the TOLIMO in the 1970s, the twenty-first century cam-
paign did not focus either on any economic benefit to be derived
from secession, nor on a desire for ethnic unity with the Ewe-speak-
ers of the former trust territory of French Togoland (now the Repub-
lic of Togo).38 Indeed Kedem, like several of the prominent Ablode
activists of the 1950s, was actually born in one of the minority
enclaves—although, like most members of these enclaves, he is also
a fluent Ewe-speaker.39
The key point here is that ethnicity is striking mainly by its
absence as a significant factor in his case. Instead, Kedem referred
directly to the previous 150 years, and called for a constitutional set-
tlement to historic grievances over the right to self-determination of
all the peoples of the former trust territory. His case turned upon the
identification of specific errors and omissions in the process by
which integration (or, as he preferred, “annexation”) had been effect-
ed in the mid-1950s. And as a former History teacher, and the holder
of a higher degree, Kedem was assiduous in his references to UN
trusteeship agreements, reports of the UN visiting missions and reso-
lutions of the UN General Assembly.
Upon reading Kedem’s work, I realized that I had not fully under-
stood either the nature of Kofi Kodzi’s objectives or the role of histo-
ry-writing within his campaign. Kodzi was deeply interested in pre-
colonial Ewe history, including the different migratory paths of the
38David Brown, “Borderline Politics in Ghana: the National Liberation Movement of
Western Togoland,” Journal of Modern African Studies 18 (1980), 575-609; David
Brown, “Who are the Tribalists? Social Pluralism and Political Ideology in Ghana,”
African Affairs 81 (1982), 37-69; David Brown, “Sieges and Scapegoats: the Politics
of Pluralism in Ghana and Togo,” Journal of Modern African Studies 21 (1983),
431-60.
39According to his memoir, The Chance of a Lifetime (Accra, 2008), Kedem comes
from Logba—which was also the hometown of S.G. Antor, who led the Togoland
Congress during the 1950s. For a discussion of the non-Ewe “enclaves,” see Paul
Nugent, “‘A few lesser peoples:’ the Central Togo Minorities and their Ewe Neigh-
bours,” in: Carola Lentz, and Paul Nugent (ed.), Ethnicity in Ghana: the Limits of
Invention (London, 2000), 162-82.
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Ewe sub-groups, and the relationships between coastal and inland
peoples during the slave trade era, and we discussed these matters on
several occasions.40 But for Kodzi, as for Kedem, it was in fact the
twentieth-century legal and political history that mattered most, and
it was this that propelled their efforts to achieve redress for the for-
mer trust territory area. Indeed, Kodzi reminded me several times
that he had taken courses in law as well as medicine whilst studying
abroad.
In researching and writing about the former British Togoland,
Kodzi and Kedem were engaged in “interpretive and representational
work” in the sense that they were addressing younger readers “back
home” who had grown up as Ghanaian citizens, and who therefore
needed to be reminded that they might also identify themselves as
“Togolanders.” However, in addressing their other audiences—par-
ticularly those in the UN, the embassies of former colonial powers,
and more recently the Ghana Constitutional Review Commission—
Kodzi and Kedem believed that their credibility depended on the
accurate citation and objective interpretation of relevant documenta-
tion. For this reason, Kedem had travelled to London in order to
carry out his own first-hand research. Paradoxically, whilst I was ini-
tially attracted by the “interpretive and representational” aspects of
Kodzi and Kedem’s work, they were more concerned that, as a uni-
versity-based researcher, I should verify their interpretation of the
primary texts. Having allowed the “stranger with big eyes” to
glimpse a little of what lay between the houses, the “local” historians
did not want her to sit quietly on the fence.
In any case, this would not have been possible. In 2008, I was sur-
prised to find that I had been cited on the website ghanaweb.com in
an article by Kofi Amenyo, entitled “Trans Volta Togoland and the
Refuseniks of the Union with Ghana.”41 The article attracted 192
40On pre-colonial Anlo and the slave trade, see Greene, Gender. An excellent sum-
mary of the available literature on pre-colonial Ewedome is provided in chapter one
of Wilson Yayoh, “Local Government in Ewedome, British Trust Territory of
Togoland (Ghana), 1920s-1970s,” PhD dissertation, SOAS (2010).
41Kofi Amenyo, “Trans Volta Togoland and the Refuseniks of the Union with
Ghana,” (8 May 2008) http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.
php?ID=143373&comment=3728992#com (accessed 6 August 2010). I am grateful
to Kwame Kwateng of the University of Cape Coast, Ghana, for bringing this article
to my attention.
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online comments, including some from readers who indicated that
they were writing from Yendi, London, Washington DC, Germany,
Amsterdam and Canada.42 The comments culminated in an angry
exchange: “Wise Observer” criticized both Nugent and me for our
failure to give greater attention to vote-rigging in our explanations of
the results of the 1956 plebiscite, and he reminded Kofi Amenyo of
the pitfalls of relying upon the “logic of outsiders.” “Kola, London”
doubted that Kofi Amenyo could be a real Ewe, and challenged him
to write a response in Ewe to prove his identity, whilst “Energy”
called Amenyo a “Judas” and a “bastard,” and advised him to “cut
the crap.”
IV
Nugent has provided a very thorough explanation of why, in spite of
its apparently illogical and intrusive colonial origins, the Ghana-
Togo border that lies across the Ewe-speaking area has proved so
resilient. My point here is not that Nugent is “wrong” or that seces-
sion is suddenly likely (or even desirable) for inhabitants of the for-
mer trust territory of British Togoland. My point is that the recent
resurgence of interest in the Togoland question challenges us to con-
sider the opposite angle: why does this issue have the capacity to
reformulate and reinvigorate itself more than half a century after the
fact, stimulating such strong feelings among people of different gen-
erations living thousands of miles apart? This requires us to pay
more attention to the post-independence era, and to find out how for-
mer Ablode activists understood and experienced the failure of their
movement to effect the reunification and joint independence of
British and French Togoland. This question has a broader relevance
to the field of African Studies because we cannot fully understand
the “authoritarian” nature of post-colonial African states without
42It is difficult to be certain of contributors’ actual locations—the list of places
above is based upon the information contributors had entered along with their
names/nicknames. For another example of how historical knowledge circulates on
the world wide web, see Tom McCaskie, “The Life and Afterlife of Yaa Asante-
waa,” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 77 (2007), 151-79.
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finding ways of recovering the experiences of those who were on the
“losing side” during contested processes of decolonization and who
thus became the enemies of newly independent governments.
It may prove impossible to answer these questions by attempting
to replicate the case study approach that historians and political sci-
entists have found so useful in their analyses of the colonial period.43
This is partly a question of availability of documents for the post-
colonial period: central government departments’ records may trail to
a halt rather earlier than we might like, and, where controversial poli-
cy areas were removed to direct presidential control, national
archives have been left with some gaping holes. The regional archive
at Ho (Volta Region) is still awaiting the significant improvements in
storage and cataloguing that other regional archives in Ghana have
enjoyed, and it seems likely that some records were deliberately
destroyed in the aftermath of the 1966 coup that toppled Nkrumah.44
Nonetheless, some of the district commissioners’ correspondence
survives, and on the francophone Togolese side of the border, the
district-level records for the Klouto area are surprisingly detailed into
the mid-1960s.
In principle, this increases our chances of understanding local pol-
itics, but the problem is that these records reflect the way in which
the district commissioner (or, on the francophone side, the “comman-
dant de cercle”) operated. They tell us about what the state sought to
achieve in a given locality, and how state representatives identified
and rewarded potential allies whilst marginalizing opponents. Dis-
trict-level files also contain some evidence of issues that individuals
or communities looked to the state to resolve—hence the many let-
43Dennis Austin was one of the first scholars to integrate a local case study (Bekwai)
into his analysis of mass nationalism in Ghana. A similar approach was later used by
Dunn and Robertson, Brown, and Nugent, among others. See Dennis Austin, Poli-
tics in Ghana 1946-1960 (London, 1964); John Dunn, and Alexander F. Robertson,
Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo (Cambridge, 1973);
Brown, “Politics;” Paul Nugent, “National Integration and the Vicissitudes of State
Power in Ghana: the Political Incorporation of Likpe, a Border Community, 1945-
1986,” PhD dissertation, SOAS (1991).
44Yayoh, “Local Government,” chapter six. Wilson Yayoh has done very valuable
work in establishing what is available in the Ho archive and teasing out some of the
key aspects of local government in Ewedome.
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ters and petitions related either to the resolution of chieftaincy dis-
putes or to the distribution of development funds.
We can certainly read these archives “against the grain” to reveal
the ingenuity of Africans in presenting district commissioners with
invented (or selectively remembered) “traditions.” But whilst district
level records permit insights into “centre-periphery relations,” and
thus, indirectly, into the instrumentalist logic of party-political affili-
ation in rural areas, there may be swathes of activity which either
escaped the district commissioner (or “commandant de cercle”) alto-
gether, or were insufficiently interesting (or perhaps too controver-
sial) to be recorded. The nature of district records is such that, whilst
they are highly suggestive of the individual and community benefits
attached to supporting the governing party, they tell us rather less
about internal dynamics of trans-national or cross-border political
movements, particularly when the individuals involved were secre-
tive about their activities and spent considerable periods in exile.
The limitations of the post-colonial archive point to the urgent
tasks of interviewing former political activists and investigating their
practices of “self-archiving.”45 Importantly, I approached elderly
individuals not as “local” historians of any particular town or district,
but rather as grass-roots participants in Ablode. This changed the
focus and dynamics of the interview: in the former scenario, politics
may be presented as an unfortunate intrusion that “brought confu-
sion” into a town at the price of internal unity and the disfavour of
the central state; in the latter scenario, the work of grassroots
activism is validated and this permits greater discussion of the ideas
and strategies of political movements operating in rural areas, includ-
ing their trans-national dimensions. The politics of the 1950s and
1960s was clearly remembered from the vantage point of the present,
45For some examples of “self-archiving” see Stephan Miescher, “‘My Own Life:’
A.K. Boakye Yiadom’s Autobiography—the Writing and Subjectivity of a Ghanaian
Teacher-Catechist,” in: Karin Barber (ed.), Hidden Histories: Everyday Literacy and
Making the Self (Bloomington/Indianapolis, 2006), 27-51; Ruth Watson, “‘What is
our Intelligence, our School Going and our Reading of Books Without Getting
Money?’ Akinpęlu Obişęsan and his Diary,” in: Karin Barber (ed.), Hidden Histo-
ries: Everyday Literacy and Making the Self (Bloomington/Indianapolis, 2006), 52-
77.
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and former activists tended to locate Ablode within popular narra-
tives of Ghana’s post-colonial political trajectory. Whilst there is not
room to consider this aspect in detail here, it is appropriate to men-
tion a second consequence of interviewing individuals as part of an
Ablode cohort: each person recognized that I would also be talking to
their fellow activists (or, where these individuals had passed on, to
their relatives).
V
Former activists put forward three main reasons for the failure of the
Togoland Congress to achieve the reunification of the trust territories
of British and French Togoland. Their primary argument—and the
one that features most prominently in Kedem’s account—concerns
the perfidy of the British. The gist of this argument was as follows:
entrusted with the economic development and the political future of
the territory of British Togoland, the British ignored its needs and
chose, for their own convenience, to administer it as part of the
neighbouring colony of the Gold Coast. They effected integration via
the “back door” by including the people of southern British Togoland
in a region with the Ewe-speakers of the Anlo and Peki areas of the
Gold Coast. By the time of the UN-supervised plebiscite in 1956, the
British had already decided in favour of integrating their trust territo-
ry with the Gold Coast, and thus gave covert support to the CPP,
which also desired integration in order to facilitate the damming of
the River Volta (the main geographical barrier between the trust ter-
ritory and the Gold Coast).46 This argument was made forcefully in
the English-language and Ewe-language propaganda of the 1950s,
and was frequently reiterated in interviews.47
However, from the vantage point of the year 2000, former Ablode
activists tended to emphasize two additional reasons for their failure
to achieve unification. Firstly, they cited early betrayals by key unifi-
46Ghana still depends on the hydro-electric power generated by the dam at Akosom-
bo on the River Volta. New research is being undertaken on Akosombo by Stephan
Miescher, University of California at Santa Barbara.
47For further detail on 1950s propaganda, see Skinner, “Reading.”
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cationists, particularly two members of the 1951 legislative assem-
bly, F.Y. Asare (of Buem) and G.O. Awuma (of Ho). Both of these
individuals were considered to have launched their political careers
on the back of unificationist sentiment, but to have “crossed the car-
pet” in order to obtain the personal status and financial rewards that
flowed from the Gold Coast majority party, the CPP. Moses Asase
lamented the character flaws of G.O. Awuma, who had been his
teacher and a major influence on his entry into Ablode politics in Ho:
“He was very talented, but you could never know with him. He will
say to you, ‘Let’s do this thing,’ and then you will just hear that he
was doing something else.”48
Whilst disinclined to attribute this epithet to any individual,
Michael Senoo explained that in his hometown of Hohoe, the term
ele memi was used to describe “a person who starts out well but ends
up unsuccessfully or badly.” This analogy was based on the observa-
tion that the lizard’s faeces are black, with a white tip. Carpet-cross-
ing, he suggested, had undermined the Togoland Union’s claim to act
as a mass nationalist movement for all the peoples of the trust territo-
ry, and therefore forced the unificationists into a party-political con-
test with the CPP.49
Tactical errors were identified as the final major factor in the fail-
ure to achieve Togoland re-unification. During the mid 1950s, unifi-
cationists focussed on the UN as an external arbiter. Considerable
time and funds were expended in constructing arguments which
appropriated the internationalist discourse of the post-war period and
asserted the duty of the international community to secure the right
of small nations (including trust territories) to self-determination.
Underlying the strategy of petitioning the UN, however, was an
48Interview with M.K. Asase, Ho-Dome, 11 August 2000.
49Interview with M. Senoo, Hohoe, 13 September 2000. The Togoland Union, which
had its headquarters in Hohoe, preceded the Togoland Congress. Advocates of
Togoland unification disagreed with each other over whether they ought to boycott
the 1951 Gold Coast elections, and this resulted in some organizational realign-
ments. The Togoland Congress emerged as the main vehicle by which the unifica-
tionists expressed their opposition to the CPP in the Gold Coast elections of 1954
and 1956, and mobilized against the integration of British Togoland with the Gold
Coast in the 1956 plebiscite. See Nugent, Smugglers, 171-88.
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assumption that power lay in New York, not in Togoland, and that
such power could be won over through the correct legalistic formula-
tion of a legitimate case. Whilst no activist doubted either the recti-
tude of the arguments that were put forward at the UN by their
leader, S.G. Antor, some also argued that Antor was too slow to
adapt to the way in which politics was moving within the Gold Coast
and within Togoland itself.
The leadership of the Congress did not anticipate the overwhelm-
ing advantages of incumbency enjoyed by the CPP, as the Gold
Coast majority party, and were thus ill-equipped to campaign in the
plebiscite of 1956. Alfred Dumoga anticipated in an interview in
2000 the same comment made online by “Wise Observer” in 2008:
“The plebiscite too, that vote was rigged in the North. The Togoland
Congress did not have enough staff. They couldn’t send agents to all
the polling stations, so there was rigging. […] Long after the results,
they [the CPP] admitted that they had cheated.”50 With the benefit of
hindsight, he concluded, “They [the Ablode leadership] should not
have allowed the plebiscite to take place. They did not have the
finance to campaign properly. […] It was a big big mistake.”51
VI
Whilst former activists may have differed as to relative significance
of these factors in their failure to achieve Togoland re-unification,
they all appeared to believe that the case they had made in the mid-
1950s was fundamentally sound and that they had been defeated for
all the wrong reasons. Communal voting patterns, however, suggest
that many Ablode strongholds began to backtrack rather quickly from
their unificationist position once the reality of CPP victory and
50Interview with A.M.K. Dumoga, Ho, 28 August 2000. In 2008, I met by chance a
former CPP activist from Yendi who indicated that he had acted as a returning offi-
cer in addition to his avid campaigning in favour of the integration of the trust terri-
tory with Ghana. He argued that the vote was not rigged as such, but that the CPP
had mobilized a well-resourced local party machinery against unification (interview
with Al-Haji Dawuda Yahaya, Nima, Accra, 21 September 2008).
51Interview with A.M.K. Dumoga, Ho, 29 August 2000. Alfred’s older brother, E.O.
Kofi Dumoga, had been one of Antor’s critics (and rivals) during the 1950s.
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Ghanaian independence became apparent. David Brown’s case study
of Kpandu outlines the pressures that were brought to bear: whole
towns—or particular quarters within towns—were effectively
excluded from the developmental resources of the state until they
relinquished their overt opposition to the CPP.52 Nugent makes a
similar observation, and also points to the problems confronting both
individual activists and their organizational network. First the CPP
banned parties that were based on ethnic or regional sentiment, thus
compelling the Togoland Congress to enter an alliance with the
Ghana-wide United Party; then, in July 1958, it passed a Preventive
Detention Act, and proceeded to arrest parliamentarians who were
representing the former Togoland Congress. One former adult educa-
tionist described the position of Ablode activists in the following
terms: “In those days, if you wanted to have your peace, it was better
to ally with the CPP. Keep quiet, go underground or cross the car-
pet—those were your options.”53 Considerations of personal safety
and financial security, along with a desire for one’s hometown to
receive its fair share of the national cake, combined to produce a
powerful logic in favour of the “keep quiet” or “cross the carpet”
options.
But what about those who did not keep quiet or cross the carpet?
Appearing at the National Reconciliation Commission in July 2003,
Robert Kwame (Bob) Antor—son of the late Togoland Congress
leader—explained the impact that his father’s five-year spell in pre-
ventive detention had had upon his family: two of his brothers had
their scholarships revoked and were removed from Mawuli sec-
ondary school. His own education was severely disrupted, and he had
to work as a pupil-teacher in order to support younger siblings. His
father’s car had also been “lost.”54 This was more than a reduction in
52Brown, “Politics”; Yayoh, “Local Government,” also considers the politicization
of local government in this period.
53Richard Banibensu during interview with Richard Banibensu and Michael Senoo,
Dansoman, Greater Accra, 14 July 2000.
54Ghana News Agency, “S.G. Antor’s Son Testifies at NRC,” (22 July 2003) http://
www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/election2008/artikel.php?ID=39657 (accessed
6 August 2010).
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status or comfort—it threatened the entire family’s strategy for
securing its economic future.
Loss of educational opportunities was also highlighted in my
interviews with other former detainees. Moses Asase spent six years
in detention, and he felt that some of his ten children had been nega-
tively affected by this: “All of my children are educated. They all
have jobs….” However, whilst most of the children had completed
secondary school, the ones who were growing up whilst he was in
detention had been forced to limit their ambitions to the fee-free
training courses that were then available for respectable but poorly
paid jobs in primary school teaching and nursing: “The mother could
not get the money for secondary school.”55 Elizabeth Ohene also
described how her father had been transferred out of his graduate
teacher post at Mawuli secondary school following accusations of
subversive political activity. She was later allowed to return to the
school, but she remembered vividly the poverty of a fellow student
who could buy no new sheets, underwear or uniform for years
because her father was in detention and could not even send her a let-
ter.56
Ghanaian Ablode activists had a great deal to lose from continued
opposition to the CPP, and the price they paid affected the next gen-
eration. This was explicitly acknowledged by the panel that heard
Bob Antor’s representation to the National Reconciliation Commis-
sion in 2003. During the 1980s, Elizabeth Ohene became an exile
from the PNDC regime, and was thus no stranger to the rough end of
Ghanaian politics. Yet, almost half-a-century after her time at
Mawuli, it was distressing for her to remember the humiliating expe-
riences endured by the children of detainees: “It is like a penance for
me to talk about this.”57 The fact that the consequences of political
failure can still be identified and are so strongly felt within particular
communities and families is the flip side of the instrumentalist logic
55Interview with M.K. Asase, Ho, 20 July 2000.
56Interview with E. Ohene, Airport Residential, Accra, 22 June 2010. The girl in
question believed that her father was dead because her letters to him were returned,
but he was released after the coup that toppled in Nkrumah in 1966.
57Interview with E. Ohene, Airport Residential, Accra, 22 June 2010.
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in favour of keeping quiet or crossing the carpet. This may partially
explain why, in spite of the apparent resilience of the Ghana-Togo
border, the Togoland question retains a Lazarus-like quality.
VII
What then of those who decided to “go underground?” If the price of
continued resistance was so high, we need also ask why some Ablode
activists refused to accept the reality of the integration of the trust
territory with Ghana and the subsequent shift towards a single-party
state. It is the trans-national and not the local dynamics of Ablode
that enable us to understand this. The Preventive Detention Act in
Ghana was passed just three months after the decisive victory of Syl-
vanus Olympio and the “Comité de l’Unité Togolaise” (CUT) in UN-
supervised elections in French Togoland (now the Republic of
Togo).58 As an increasing number of arrests were made throughout
Ghana, including the former British Togoland, Ablode activists
began to flee across the border into francophone Togo to avoid
detention. By October 1961, the Togolese minister of the interior
informed the UN that 5,700 Ghanaians (belonging to various ethnic
groups and former opposition parties) had taken refuge in Togo.
Those from the former British Togoland clustered around the towns
of Lomé and Kpalimé and in the area of Akposso-Badou.59 Nugent
indicates that,
Whereas the experience of exile may heighten a sense of political griev-
ance, in this case the refugees appear to have been deterred from main-
taining an active interest in unification politics. The Togolese authorities
did not wish to add credence to Ghanaian claims that they were encourag-
ing subversion, and specifically informed the refugees that they could
only stay if they desisted from engaging in political activity. It is easy to
see that a highly politicised refugee population might pose a threat to the
power base of the Olympio regime itself.
58D.E.K. Amenumey, “The General Elections in the ‘Autonomous Republic of
Togo,’ April 1958: Background and Interpretation,” Transactions of the Historical
Society of Ghana 16 (1975), 47-65.
59National Archives, Kew, UK. DO 195/75 Ghana-Togo Relations: UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees, Geneva, to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London,
13 February 1962.
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Exile, then, was a “rather solitary experience” characterised more by
material hardship than by political activism.60
However, whilst some of the former refugees whom I interviewed
certainly recalled the material hardships that they and their children
had endured, they also indicated that, far from being cowed by their
experiences, they had sought out new avenues through which to
advocate for the unification of the two Togolands. Edward Mfojoh (a
goldsmith) crossed the border in June 1960. He described Kpalimé as
a hive of activity: refugees were drawn to it in the knowledge that
they would find their fellow activists. He stated that he travelled reg-
ularly between Kpalimé and Lomé in order to attend meetings with
Olympio: “I met him plenty of times, sitting down next to him and
talking to him, just like I am with you now.”61 Mercy Akosua Tegbe
(one of the wives of the late Togbe Gabusu IV of Hohoe) also
recalled that her husband had spent most of his time attending politi-
cal meetings, along with the Howusu, Mote Kofi.62 When I asked
former refugee Agnes Tachie Adzraku, wife of the late chief of
Kpandu Aloi, whether she and her husband had talked with Olympio
about the unification issue, she responded: “Ha! We talked about
nothing else!”63
Traces of activity can also be detected in the petitions of refugee
organizations: as late as 1965, the Western Togo Refugees’ Union
petitioned the Togo government on a variety of matters regarding the
material welfare of refugees, and repeatedly stated their hope that it
would effect the reunification of the two Togolands. The Union
elected Ebenezer Dumoga—a brother of the former Togoland Con-
gress activist E.O. Kofi Dumoga—as its secretary. Younger refugees
established their own organisation—the Committee of Youths for the
60Nugent, Smugglers, 215-16.
61Interview with E.K. Mfojoh, Sokode-Gbagble, 19 July 2000. I am grateful to
Lydia Osei-Brantuo for acting as interpreter.
62Mote Kofi had been paramount chief of the Asogli state during the 1940s, but was
forced to cede this position after several bitter disputes (some of which related to the
Togoland unification issue). He therefore reverted to the title “Howusu” which was
given to him in the town of Ho Dome.
63Interview with Agnes Tachie Adzraku, Kpandu Aloi, 7 June 2010. I am grateful to
Cecilia Dusi for introducing me to this elderly lady and acting as interpreter during
the interview.
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Refugees—which also clearly stated its desire for reunification,
adopting the terms “Western Togo” and “Eastern Togo” to describe
the former British and French Togolands.64
Contemporary studies of the foreign policies of post-colonial West
African states focus on the troubled relationship between Nkrumah
and Olympio.65 Whilst Nkrumah struggled to build a socialist state
and to realise Pan-African unity, Olympio hoped to achieve a greater
measure of economic and diplomatic autonomy from France, whilst
simultaneously asserting Togo’s viability as an independent nation in
the face of Nkrumah’s threats to annex the Republic of Togo to
Ghana. In the context of the Cold War, Olympio was well-placed to
build up alliances with western aid donors, because the British and
the United States governments became increasingly wary of
Nkrumah and desired the survival of both the Republic of Togo and
the Olympio regime. The British, however, were opposed to any
renegotiation of the status of their former trust territory, and the Unit-
ed States government, despite its more overt disapproval of the
Nkrumah regime, was cautious about over-committing itself in West
Africa.
The records of the British Foreign Office outline the indirect pres-
sures that were brought to bear upon Olympio, who appeared to
gradually relinquish the unification issue in order to preserve the
fledgling Republic of Togo and to promote its broader national inter-
ests. From the perspective of the refugees, however, the situation
may have looked rather different. In effect, the refugees experienced
two “Independences”—one in Ghana and the other in Togo—and if
the former was something to be mourned, the latter called for cele-
bration. In Ghana, Ablode was the slogan of the defeated Togoland
64Archives Nationales Togolaises, Lomé. Series: Klouto, Dossier 110 Affaires Poli-
tiques: Western Togo Refugees’ Union, Kpalimé, to Ministre de l’intérieur, 26 Octo-
ber 1965; Petition from the Western Togo Refugees’ Union, Kpalimé to the Presi-
dent of the Republic, Lomé, 11 August 1965; W.K. Prempeh, Secretary of the Com-
mittee of the Youths for the Refugees, Kpalimé, to Adjoint Commandant, Cercle de
Klouto, Kpalimé, n.d.
65W. Scott Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology
and the New State (Princeton NJ, 1969); E.O. Saffu, “Nkrumah and the Togoland
Question,” Economic Bulletin of Ghana 12, 2/3 (1968), 37-46.
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Congress, whereas in (francophone) Togo, Ablode was the slogan of
the victorious CUT—a party which regularly reaffirmed its commit-
ment to Togoland reunification.66 And in Togo, the refugees were on
the “right side” of a very similar kind of politics to that which they
had seen in Ghana.
Women in Ghana wore Kwame Nkrumah cloth to display their
loyalty to the CPP, whilst those in Togo, including the Ghanaian
refugees, bought Sylvanus Olympio cloth to display their loyalty to
“Unité Togolaise.”67 Chieftaincy disputes in Ghana were settled in
favour of candidates who supported the CPP, whilst those in Togo
were settled in favour of those who had backed the CUT.68 “Ablode
soldats” in Togo were engaging in acts of violence against their
opponents in the “Parti Togolais du Progrès,” whilst the Ghanaian
police force was deployed against those who had opposed the CPP.69
66Before independence, Olympio’s party was known as the “Comité de l’Unité Togo-
laise,” but after independence this was abbreviated to “Unité Togolaise.” At a two-
day congress in Kpalimé in March 1962, the party passed a motion urging that the
government should “do everything possible to obtain by peaceful means the reunifi-
cation of the two Togos,” West Africa, 17 March 1962. Similarly, the national assem-
bly, which, after 1958, was dominated by “Unité Togolaise,” continued to pass
motions in favour of reunification. National Archives, Kew, UK. DO 195/75 Ghana-
Togo Relations: doc. 24, Corbett, British Embassy, Lomé, to British embassy, Dakar,
UK High Commission, Accra and Lagos, and Foreign Office, London, 7 June 1961.
67Interview with Mercy Akosua Tegbe, Hohoe, 19 September 2000. When I asked
this elderly lady if she had any “Ablode cloth,” she had told me that she had thought
I might ask to see it and that she would put in on for me so that I could photograph
her. She appeared dressed in a cloth bearing a picture of Olympio, that read, in Ewe,
Amega Sylvanus Olympio, Dudonunola Gbato. Ablode Blibo. This translates as,
“Leader Sylvanus Olympio, First President. Freedom Everywhere.”
68The Togolese national archives held entire files devoted to the chieftaincy disputes
that had been resolved after the critical election of 1958. Across the Kpalimé area,
chiefs who had supported the French were destooled and replaced by those who had
supported the nationalists. I found one case in which the destooled chief turned out
to be an uncle of a CUT cabinet minister. When I interviewed the minister, he
explained to me that in this particular case, the chief had not been politically active
in any party. Rather, the elders wished to destool him because he was accused of
inappropriate conduct with other men’s wives. The elders had believed, however,
that Sam Klu, the new “commandant de cercle,” would be more likely to endorse the
destoolment if they told him that the chief had been a “Progrès” supporter. Interview
with Ernest Anani Gassou, Lomé, 21 June 2000.
69One incident included the arrival of 51 Togolese nationals in Ghana on 16 April
1961. They claimed that they had been attacked in their villages for not voting in the
Togolese presidential and parliamentary elections that were held on 9 April 1961
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In Ghana, the discovery of “conspiracies”—such as that in Octo-
ber 1961 following the Sekondi-Takoradi workers’ strike—provided
the government with an excuse to intern the opposition. Similarly,
the discovery of a plot to assassinate Olympio in December 1961
prompted Théophile Mally, minister of the interior, to take into
detention all members of the opposition—who were reportedly tor-
tured until they confessed to their conspiracy. On 14 January 1962,
all opposition parties in Togo were banned. Just as the CPP govern-
ment silenced the Ashanti Pioneer newspaper in December 1960, so
the December 1961 “conspiracy” was used by the “Unité Togolaise”
to silence newspapers such as Togo Observateur.70
In comparison with both the pre-colonial and colonial periods,
these years of Togo’s history are under-researched, and the small
number of Togolese historians who have written about the early
independence era have tended to pursue one of two agendas: either
they wish to expose the failings and the divisiveness of the Olympio
regime in order assert the necessity of Gnassingbé Eyadéma’s long
period of authoritarian single-party rule (1967-2005); or they wish to
salvage the reputation of Olympio as the leader of the independence
struggle and a martyr to democracy in Africa.71
Considerations of space prevent a full discussion on the historiog-
raphy of the Republic of Togo, but I would like to conclude here by
drawing attention to an unusual and valuable historical source which
may enable us to understand more about why the Togoland unifica-
tion remained so important into the 1960s, and the implications of
this for the Ghanaian refugee population in Togo.
and won by Olympio and his party, “Unité Togolaise.” National Archives, Kew,
UK. DO 195/75 Ghana-Togo Relations: doc. 1A, UK High Commission, Accra, to
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, London, 4 May 1961.
70Paragraph based on National Archives, Kew, UK. DO 195/75 Ghana-Togo Rela-
tions: doc. 82, British Embassy, Lomé, to J.H.A. Watson, H.M. Ambassador, Dakar,
18 January 1962.
71See for example Wen’Saa Ogma Yagla, L’édification de la nation togolaise: nais-
sance d’une conscience nationale dans un pays africain (Paris, 1978); Tetevi God-
win Tete-Adjaloo, Histoire du Togo: le régime et l’assassinat de Sylvanus Olympio
(1960-1963) (Paris, 2002). In arguing for a social history approach to the colonial
period, Benjamin Lawrance also comments on the tendency towards hagiographies
of Olympio. See Benjamin N. Lawrance, Locality, Mobility and “Nation:” Peri-
Urban Colonialism in Togo’s Eweland 1900-1960 (Rochester NY, 2007).
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Partly as a result of his austerity budgets and his inclination
towards western allies, Olympio faced internal dissent from the left-
leaning Juvento (with which “Unité Togolaise” had previously been
allied). Olympio was particularly perturbed by the prospect of a
Juvento-CPP pact to overthrow his regime, and he thus informed the
British “chargé d’affaires” in Lomé that:
He [Olympio] did not think that Nkrumah was likely to try to take over
Togo by force as this would antagonise the rest of Africa. […] The over-
throw of the Togolese government by subversive means was a much more
likely policy and Togolese opponents of the present government were
being trained in Ghana for just such a purpose. President Olympio
showed great anxiety for help in countering this Ghanaian subversion
[…] during his recent visit to America, the US Government, whose appre-
ciation of Nkrumah’s intentions was the same as his own, had offered
their help in counter-intelligence and security training.72
Whilst opposition newspapers were banned, the Togolese govern-
ment gave permission for an Ewe-language newspaper, Ablode Safui
(the “Key to Freedom”), to be produced by a former Juventist, Holi-
day Komedja, in his home village of Agu-Nyogbo, approximately six
kilometers outside the town of Kpalimé. This paper celebrated
Togo’s accession to independence, whilst reviling Nkrumah and his
acts of aggression both against the Togolese state and against those
Ablode supporters who remained in Ghana.73 Komedja explained that
he made contact with various foreign embassies in Lomé, and
received news items through this route (particularly via the German
embassy), as well as by collecting up foreign newspapers (including
the Ghanaian Evening News). He certainly intended to keep his read-
ers informed of events beyond the Ewe-speaking areas, following
stories that ranged from the secession of Katanga to the prospects of
reunification for East and West Germany.
72National Archives, Kew, UK. DO 195/75 Ghana-Togo Relations: doc. 101, Oliver
Kemp, British Embassy, Lomé, to K.M. Wilford, West and Central Africa Dept,
Foreign Office, London, 21 April 1961.
73Copies of this paper are available in the Archives Nationales Togolaises, Lomé,
Series: Klouto; Dossier 266. I was also able to interview the man who had produced
the paper. Interview with H.K.V. Komedja, Agu-Nyogbo, 29 June 2000.
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Nonetheless, a substantial part of most issues is devoted to the
border question. The purpose of these articles was not always to
track any specific new development, so much as to critique state-
ments made by Nkrumah or by those whom he had appointed in the
former British Togoland. Komedja also responded directly to stories
culled from the pro-CPP Evening News, regularly taking on its analy-
sis or conclusions, and using Ablode Safui to explain to readers the
errors therein. The paper, written almost entirely in Ewe, was avail-
able all over the Klouto district that surrounded the town of Kpalimé,
and it also seems to have found its way over the border into Ghana.74
Komedja, recalled that his newspaper was also purchased by
refugees in the Kpalimé area—most of whom would not have been
able to read the Lomé-based press due to their lack of French.
Because issues of Ablode Safui appear in Klouto district files as
“dépôt légal” it seems likely that Sam Klu (the “commandant de cer-
cle”) not only knew of Ablode Safui but actively encouraged its pub-
lication. Whilst Olympio’s external allies had no desire to see an
active re-opening of the border question, it was within his interests at
home to show that Unité togolaise remained committed to the reuni-
fication of the two Togolands and their achievement of joint national
sovereignty. A continued insistence on unification appears to be
intended to deter Juventists from contemplating Nkrumah’s proposi-
tion that francophone Togo should be annexed to Ghana, and this
was also a message that the Ghanaian Ablode refugees very much
wanted to hear.
VII
The quest for powerful external allies was a key feature of the cam-
paign to reunify the two Togolands in the 1950s, and it remained
important throughout the post-colonial period and up to the present
74Several informants, including E.K. Mfojoh, remembered that they were sometimes
able to get this paper in Ho. The British High Commission reported: “The Ghana
government also found it necessary in October 1960 to ban the import into Ghana of
an Ewe-language newspaper published in Togo.” National Archives, Kew, UK. DO
195/75 Ghana-Togo Relations: doc 1A, UK High Commission, Accra, to the Secre-
tary of State for Commonwealth Relations, London, 4 May 1961.
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day. Ablode activists during the 1950s invested considerable time
and funds in formulating and presenting to the UN a legalistic case
that emphasized the right of the Togoland trust territories to self-
determination. After the UN disappointed them, Ablode activists
from British Togoland were forced to reassess their options. Calcula-
tions of personal and community interests are certainly important in
explaining why some individuals chose to relinquish the aim of
Togoland reunification, and in this respect attention to local histories
and to intra-local disputes is important.
Nonetheless, recent history-writing by people who originate from
the former British Togoland indicates that the controversy over its
status has had a surprisingly long post-colonial tail. My contention
here is that a “local history” approach will not enable us to under-
stand how or why this struggle was maintained into the 1960s and
has been periodically revived up to the present day. Rather, we need
to pay attention to cohorts of activists’ experiences of exile, and thus
to the trans-national and diasporic dimensions of political struggles
which were previously thought to be about “small-scale identities.”
The evidence for this turns up in unexpected forms and in far-flung
places, and renders the study of post-colonial history all the more
exciting.
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